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DIVISION OF LABOR STANDARDS ENFORCEMENT
    Department of Industrial Relations
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                            BEFORE THE LABOR COMMISSIONER
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                                 STATE OF CALIFORNIA
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   WESLEY SNIPES,
                                         CASE NO. TAC 36-96
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         Petitioner,
                                        DETERMINATION
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   vs.
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   DOLORES ROBINSON ENTERTAINMENT,
   a California corporation; and
   DOLORES ROBINSON, an individual
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Respondents.

A Petition to Determine Controversy was filed in this matter on November 16, 1996. Petitioner [hereinafter referred to as "Snipes"] alleges, inter alia, therein that respondents [hereinafter collectively referred to as "Mrs. Robinson"] violated the Talent Agencies Act by acting in the capacity of a talent agent without being licensed, in violation of Labor Code section 1700.5. The Petition recites that earlier Mrs. Robinson filed a demand for arbitration with the American Arbitration Association seeking commissions allegedly due her pursuant to the written agreement under which Mrs. Robinson performed the services in question.

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Snipes seeks a determination from the Labor Commissioner that this written agreement is void ab initio and is therefore unenforceable. Snipes also seeks restitution of all sums paid to Mrs. Robinson as commissions pursuant to the written agreement.

Mrs. Robinson has conceded that she is not a licensed talent agent but denies that she has violated the Talent Agencies Act. She argues that she did not solicit work for Snipes and, in the alternative, that she acted "in conjunction with, and at the request of, a licensed talent agency" within the meaning of Labor Code section 1700.44(d). In addition, she claims that the Petition is barred by the one-year statute of limitations set forth in Labor Code section 1700.44(c) and has requested dismissal of the Petition on this ground.

The matter came on for two days of hearing on October 29 and 30, 1997, before Thomas S. Kerrigan, Special Hearing Officer, in Los Angeles, California. Snipes appeared through his attorneys, Stanton L. Stein and Karen L. Dillon of Stein & Kahan; Mrs. Robinson appeared through Lawrence Y. Iser and Kristen L. Spanier of Greenberg, Glusker, Fields, Claman & Machtinger. The matter was taken under submission at the close of the hearing.

ISSUES

The questions presented in this matter are as follows:

- 1. Did Mrs. Robinson function as a talent agent as defined in the Labor Code?
- 2. If so, did Mrs. Robinson act "in conjunction with, and at the request of," a licensed talent agent?
 - Is the Petition barred by the one-year statute of limitations

DISCUSSION AND FINDINGS

The parties stipulated that at all times material to the allegations of the Petition Snipes was an artist within the meaning of Labor Code section 1700.44 (b) and Mrs. Robinson was not a licensed talent agent.

It is uncontradicted that Snipes was represented by Creative Artists Agency [hereinafter referred to as "CAA"], one of the leading talent agencies in the world, in July of 1990, a time when he was first beginning to attain prominence as a film actor. He expressed the desire at that time to be represented by an artist's manager to Donna Chavous, who was then his representative at CAA. Chavous recommended to Snipes that he meet with Mrs. Robinson. Snipes subsequently met with Mrs. Robinson and decided to retain her as his artist manager. Shortly thereafter, they entered into the aforementioned written agreement. Mrs. Robinson continued to represent Snipes in this capacity until he purported to terminate their relationship in the middle of 1994.

There was testimony from Douglas Robinson, Snipes' present agent and no relation to Mrs. Robinson, and Barry Hirsch, Snipes' attorney, that though Mrs. Robinson worked mostly in the personal area for Snipes, she also negotiated major film deals on Snipes' behalf. For example, on the film Water Dance, Mrs. Robinson purportedly negotiated perquisites for Snipes, including travel, housing, per diem, and a rental car, though supposedly not requested by CAA to do so. She also had discussions with the producers of the film Sugar Hill about Snipes' compensation for

Mrs. Robinson's position in this regard was rejected in an Order Denyi
Respondents' Request for Certification of Lack of Controversy, which order antedat

Respondents' Request for Certification of Lack of Controversy, which order antedat the hearing, on the ground that the Petition was filed within one year respondent's demand for arbitration. Her renewed objection on this point is al rejected.

appearing in that film and admitted to Hirsch and Douglas Robinson that she had negotiated the perquisites on that film as well. With respect to the film Star Gate, Mrs. Robinson represented to them that she had received a seven million dollar offer for Snipes' services. She related to them her discussions with the producers of the film White Men Can't Jump about Snipes being "right" for a role in that film. She also told them she had negotiated an Acura automobile for Snipes as compensation for appearing in a Taco Bell commercial.

Snipes testified that all proposals for his services went through Mrs. Robinson. He claimed that she promised at the beginning of their relationship to seek opportunities for him in films. He claimed she was the person who was primarily involved in obtaining perquisites for him when he worked on these films, including the employment of trainers, bodyguards, and chefs. He first heard about film projects from Mrs. Robinson, not from his agent. On one film, Demolition Man, she told him she was able to double an offer to Snipes from two million dollars to four million dollars.

Chavous, on the other hand, testified that she, Mrs. Robinson, and Barry Hirsch, Snipes' attorney, functioned as a "team" in furthering Snipes' career. To her knowledge, CAA was the only member of the team to solicit deals for Snipes. According to Chavous, Mrs. Robinson worked in the area of attending to Snipes' personal needs after the deal was consummated by Chavous, e.g., making sure he had the proper amenities on the set during filming of a number of motion pictures in which he appeared.

Mrs. Robinson denied that she negotiated any film deals for Snipes, insisting that she primarily worked in the area of handling personal concerns for Snipes while he was making these films, including interceding

when Snipes, his attendants, friends, or family ran into personal difficulties that required attention. Evidence of various incidents that required Mrs. Robinson's intervention in this regard was adduced at the hearing. She admitted that as part of coordinating the efforts on behalf of Snipes career she oversaw the efforts of the other members of the "team" and made suggestions, but that CAA and Hirsch did the direct negotiating on all of Snipes film deals.

There is, as it can be seen, an apparent contradiction between the testimony of Douglas Robinson, Barry Hirsch, and Snipes, on the one hand, and Mrs. Robinson and Donna Chavous, on the other. If the former group of witnesses is to be believed, Mrs. Robinson's actions qualify as those of a talent agent. As counsel for Snipes point out, even negotiations that "exploit" employment offers emanating from the outside constitute prohibited solicitation when done by unlicensed persons within the meaning of the Talent Agency Act (see Hall v. X Management, Inc., T.A.C. 19-90 at pp. 29-30).

But if Mrs. Robinson and Donna Chavous were to be discredited in their testimony on this important point, that would not end our inquiry. Mrs. Robinson's second line of defense is that even assuming the Labor Commissioner finds that she acted as a talent agent in negotiating a contract or contracts on behalf of Snipes, she is exempt from the prohibitions of the law under the provisions of Labor Code section 1700.44 (d). The assertion of this defense necessitates careful analysis. To qualify under those express provisions requires the satisfaction of a twofold burden of proof, i.e., the person claiming the exemption must prove that he or she acted both (1) "at the request of," and (2) "in conjunction" with, a licensed talent agent during the course of the events in question.

Here, the undisputed evidence is that Mrs. Robinson was introduced to Snipes by Donna Chavous, Snipes agent at CAA, and that Ms. Chavous recommended Mrs. Robinson to Snipes for retention as his artist manager.

There can accordingly be no question that at least initially Mrs. Robinson was performing her services in response to a request from CAA.

Furthermore, there is no evidence that when Douglas Robinson came into the picture that either he or anyone else from CAA asked Mrs. Robinson to cease what she was doing on Snipes' behalf. In fact, the evidence is squarely to the contrary. Accordingly, it appears clear that Mrs. Robinson performed her functions from 1990 through 1994 at the continuing request of CAA.

The second requirement of the exemption is that the artist manager shows that he or she worked "in conjunction" with the licensed talent agent. The arrangement here commenced, according to the testimony of Mrs. Robinson and Donna Chavous, as a bona fide team undertaking. Donna Chavous was responsible for soliciting work for Snipes and negotiating his contracts and Mrs. Robinson was responsible for handling his personal affairs. In this connection Douglas Robinson admitted that after he took over the account he spoke to Mrs. Robinson on the telephone "ten times a day." The exhibits received in evidence, moreover, show that CAA and Hirsch were intimately involved in all of the negotiations and that Mrs. Robinson was at all times working closely with them. This correspondence

Though there was testimony that later on CAA never expressly requested Mrs. Robinson to negotiate this or that perquisite, this testimony must be discounted when the entire arrangement between the parties is duly considered. It is understandable that in daily interaction over the course of time during a continuing series of business transactions the parties tend to begin to deal with one another as though certain things were understood. The requirements of the statute cannot be construed to call for a game of "Mother May I?" every time an artist manager takes some action during a long term relationship of the nature reflected in this case. To find otherwise would be to ignore the realities of day to day life in the film industry.

may be the most reliable indicator of the true relationship between the parties. When viewed in toto, the evidence therefore establishes that Mrs. Robinson acted in conjunction with CAA in performing services on Snipes behalf.

We accordingly find that Mrs. Robinson did not violate the provisions of the Talent Agencies Act because, whether or not she engaged in or carried on the occupation of an unlicensed talent agent without being licensed within the meaning of Labor Code section 1700.5, a disputed factual issue which we do not here resolve, it is clear that she acted at the request of and in conjunction with a licensed talent agent within the meaning of Labor Code section 1700.44(d) at all times.

Counsel for Snipes warns that if the exemption contained in section 1700.44(d) is found to exist in this case, it will be taken by unscrupulous artist managers as a sign that the law may be circumvented by pro forma alliances between artist managers and licensed talent agents with the result that what would otherwise qualify as violations of the law may go unregulated. While we are cognizant of the possibilities of abuse in this area, the determination here is limited to the facts of this case. The undisputed evidence presented, which was well documented by the correspondence and other exhibits offered by Mrs. Robinson, showed a close and continuing relationship between her organization and one of the most well-known talent agencies in the world. Based on this record we find no showing of either subterfuge or an attempt to circumvent the law.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

- 1. Petitioner is an "artist" within the meaning of Labor Code section 1700.44(a). The Labor Commissioner has jurisdiction to determine this controversy pursuant to Labor Code section 1700.44(a).
 - 2. Respondents acted "in conjunction with, and at the request of,

a licensed talent agency" within the meaning of Labor Code section 1700.44 1 (d) and therefore their actions, if any, in the negotiation of employment contracts for petitioner are not unlawful. 3 DETERMINATION 4 Petitioner having failed to sustain its burden of proving that 5 respondents violated Labor Code section 1700.5, the Petition is dismissed 6 with prejudice. 7 DATED: April 1, 1998 DIVISION OF LABOR STANDARDS ENFORCEMENT Department of Industrial Relations State of California 9 anse Kerric 10 Thomas S. Kerrida Special Hearing officer 11 12 13 The above Determination is adopted by the Labor Commissioner in its 14 entirety. 15 DATED: April 7, 1998 16 State Labor Commissioner 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27

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